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NOTES
HOMOSEXUALITY IN HIGH SCHOOL:
RECOGNIZING A STUDENT'S RIGHT TO
PRIVACY
BARI NADWORNYt
INTRODUCTION

Skye Wyatt was a straight-A student at her high school in
the East Texas town of Kilgore.' She had participated in school
athletics since eighth grade, including two years of playing
softball at Kilgore High School. 2 She was a well-liked player on
the softball team and led a normal teenage life.3 On March 3,
2009, Skye attended a meeting of the varsity softball team on
which she played.4 The meeting was held at an off-campus
playing field where practices regularly took place.5 When Skye
arrived at the meeting, her two softball coaches dismissed the
rest of the team and led Skye to a nearby locker room and locked
the door.6 They began to question her about an alleged
relationship with a young woman named Hillary Nutt.7
I Editor-in-Chief, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2015, St. John's
University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, Political Science: Law and
Politics, 2012, Macaulay Honors College at Queens College, CUNY. The author
would like to thank Professor John Q. Barrett for his guidance in writing this Note.
The author would also like to thank all of the staff members and editors of the St.
John's Law Review for their hard work and dedication to this publication. Special
thanks to Kathryn Christoforatos for her great work as Managing Editor.
1 Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 2013); Brief of PlaintiffAppellee, Wyatt, 718 F.3d 496 (No. 11-41359), 2012 WL 2374254, at *5.
2 Complaint
11, Wyatt, 718 F.3d 496 (No. 610-cv-674), 2010 WL 5409514.
3 Id. $ 12.
1 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 500.
5 Id.; Complaint, supra note 2,
13.
6 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 500; Complaint, supra note 2,
13-14.
7 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 500; Complaint, supra note 2,
15. The facts after this

point in the story are in dispute and certain inconsistencies exist. The Fifth Circuit
notes that in her Complaint, Skye alleges that her coach asked if she was gay, but in
her deposition she definitively stated that her coaches did not directly ask her if she
was a lesbian. Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 501. Additionally, in her Complaint, Skye states
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According to Skye, the coaches then yelled at her, falsely accused
her of spreading rumors regarding the sexual orientation of one
of the coaches, and threatened to tell her mother that she was in
a sexual relationship with another woman.8
Following this meeting, the coaches called Skye's mother and
requested that they meet at the softball field. 9 During this
meeting, the coaches disclosed to Mrs. Wyatt that her daughter
was a lesbian and was dating an eighteen-year-old woman. 10
After this meeting, the coaches removed Skye from the softball
damaging
her
future
educational
team,
potentially
opportunities. 1 The disclosure of Skye's sexual orientation to her
mother caused Skye severe emotional distress, resulted in social
isolation, and robbed Skye of her freedom to consider her
sexuality privately in her own way and on her own terms. 12 In a
sworn statement, Skye explained that she had trouble sleeping,
contemplated suicide, and started skipping school.13
Mrs. Wyatt promptly informed the school's principal, the
assistant athletic director, and the superintendent of what had
happened.1 4 She shared her concern that Skye had been
confronted alone by two authority figures, that they decided to
reveal private information about Skye without her permission,
and that Skye was suffering negative social consequences as a
result.'5 No disciplinary action was taken against the coaches,
effectively permitting and condoning their actions." The formal
justification provided by the school for the coaches'
that at the time of the confrontation she was dating Nutt, but in her appellate brief
she states that the two were not in a relationship. Id.
15, 18; Brief of Plaintiff8 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 500; Complaint, supra note 2,
Appellee, supra note 1, at *8. In contrast, the coaches claim to have asked Skye
about her relationship with Nutt because they thought Nutt was a bad influence on
Skye and they never asked her if she was gay or a lesbian. Brief of Appellants,
Wyatt, 718 F.3d 496 (No. 11-41359), 2012 WL 1339287, at *7-8.
9 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 501; Complaint, supra note 2, 19.
10 Complaint, supra note 2,
20. The parties' characterizations of this event
differ and the claim involving the revelation of Skye's sexual orientation became
"ever more nuanced over the course of the briefing" before the appeal. See Wyatt, 718
F.3d at 501.
11Complaint, supra note 2, 23.
12 Id.
12, 23; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 1, at *10-11.
13 John Wright, Softball Coaches Accused of Outing E. Texas Teen,
DALLASVOICE.COM (Dec. 15, 2011, 6:05 PM), http://www.dallasvoice.com/softballcoaches-accused-outing-e-texas-teen- 1096869.html.
14 Complaint, supra note 2, %24.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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nonconsensual disclosure of Skye's sexual orientation was that
they were "legally obligated to share this information with the
parent."17
Mrs. Wyatt filed three separate grievances with Kilgore
Independent School District alleging that the coaches acted
inappropriately by disclosing her daughter's sexual orientation,
but all three grievances were dismissed.'8
She then filed a
complaint in federal court as next-friend of her minor daughter
against the school district, and, in their individual capacities, the
athletic director, and both of the coaches. 9 Mrs. Wyatt brought
her claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution alleging that the named defendants violated her
daughter's federal rights.2 °
Skye's unfortunate experience raises a constitutional
question that has rarely been litigated: whether a high school
student has a right to privacy with respect to his or her sexual
orientation, even with regard to the student's parent.2 ' This Note
attempts to identify the constitutional rights that minors hold,
specifically in the high school context, over information about
their sexual orientation. As more teens are "coming out" at
younger ages, 12 identifying and understanding the contours of
this privacy right is relevant to increasing numbers of students.
This Note argues that high school officials disclosing information
about a student's sexual orientation without the student's
permission is a violation of the student's constitutional right to
informational privacy. Part I examines the Supreme Court's
informational privacy jurisprudence. This Part also examines
the circuit court opinions that have contributed to the law in this
area regarding personal sexual matters. Part II examines the
current split of authority between the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, which has held that such a privacy right exists, and the
17 Id. $I27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 501 (5th Cir.

2013).
Id. at 502.
20 Id. Mrs. Wyatt also brought claims under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and under the Texas Constitution, but only the claim
involving the Fourteenth Amendment is at issue here. See id.
21 The issues discussed in this Note may also concern the privacy rights of other
members of the LGBTQ community. However, based on the factual details of the two
main cases that this Note highlights, only homosexuality is at issue in this Note.
22 See Benoit Denizet-Lewis, Coming Out in Middle School, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/magazine/27out-t.html?page
wanted=all&_r=O.
'9
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has held that it does not.23
Part III aims to illuminate the privacy rights of high school
students regarding sexual orientation by analyzing and
analogizing their privacy rights in other sexual matters such as
pregnancy, abortion, and contraception.
I.
A.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

ConstitutionalRight to InformationalPrivacy

The constitutional right to privacy is derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 24 The
Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional right to privacy
in Griswold v. Connecticut,25 in which the Court declared
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives
by married couples.
The Court found that this right to privacy
emanated from the "penumbras" of rights protected by the Bill of
Rights." This decision validated a dissent written nearly forty
28
years earlier by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States,
a case that addressed whether the use of evidence of private
telephone conversations intercepted by means of wire tapping
amounted to a constitutional violation.2 9
Justice Brandeis
described the privacy right as "the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized

23 See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000);
Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 499.
24 The Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26 Id. at 485. In Griswold, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood
League of Connecticut and a licensed physician, who was also the Medical Director
for the League and its Center in New Haven, were arrested for violating Connecticut
state law which made it a crime to assist or counsel anyone who used any drug or
medicinal article for the purpose of preventing contraception. Id. at 480. They gave
"information, instruction, and medical advice" to married people concerning the
methods of preventing conception. Id.
27 Id. at 484-86 (explaining that the right of marital privacy is protected
because it is within the protected penumbras of specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights).
28 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
21 Id. at 455.
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men."30 In order to protect this right, "every unjustifiable
intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a [constitutional]
violation."3 1 The Griswold decision emphasized the intimacy of
the marital relationship by determining that personal decisions
relating to marriage must be free from governmental intrusion.3 2
The narrow holding of Griswold was later expanded in
Eisenstadt v. Baird.3 In Eisenstadt, the Court invalidated a
Massachusetts law that deemed it a felony to give anyone other
than a married person contraceptive medicines or devices. 4 The
Court held that the right to privacy was not dependent on being
in a certain relationship, stating that "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."35
The Court next considered the right to privacy in the context
of abortion. 36 A year after Eisenstadt,in Roe v. Wade,37 the Court
observed "that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution.""
However, this guarantee of certain zones of
privacy encompasses "only personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' ,
Such rights generally include "matters relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education."40

Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id.
32 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
33 405 U.S. 438 (1972). William Baird was convicted under Massachusetts state
law for exhibiting contraceptive articles in the course of delivering a lecture on
contraception to a group of students at Boston University, and for giving a young
woman a package of Emko vaginal foam at the close of his address. Id. at 440.
30

31

"4 Id. at 453.
35 Id.
36 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
31410 U.S. 113.
38 Id. at 152.
19Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
40 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
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A few years later, the constitutional right to privacy was
further developed in Whalen v. Roe,4 a case in which the Court
addressed the nature of an individual's right to privacy over the
individual's own information.4 2 In Whalen, the Court considered
the constitutionality of a New York statute that required doctors
to provide the state with copies of prescriptions for certain drugs
with legitimate but also dangerous illegitimate uses. 43 The
statute was designed to help prevent: the use of stolen or revised
prescriptions, patients from obtaining the same prescription from
multiple doctors, and doctors from over-prescribing. 44 Although
the constitutionality of the statute was upheld, the Court
described two types of connected privacy rights as protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment: an individual's interest in
autonomy in intimate matters, and an individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.4"
The Court reaffirmed the sentiment of Whalen in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services,46 a case in which former
President Nixon challenged the Presidential Recordings and
This Act allowed the
Materials Preservation Act.47
Administrator of General Services to take custody of presidential
materials, including personal and private materials, and have
them screened by Government archivists. 48 Despite the public
nature of the President's role, the Court acknowledged the right
of individuals to control certain aspects of their own personal
information, such as the contents of private and personal
communications .49
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has said little more
about the right of individuals to control certain aspects of their
own personal information. In 2011, in National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) v. Nelson,5 ° the Court considered
the constitutionality of the extensive background checks required
41

429 U.S. 589 (1977).

42

Id. at 599-600.

43

Id. at 591.

4

45
46

Id. at 592.
Id. at 599-600.
433 U.S. 425 (1977). "One element of privacy has been characterized as 'the

individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.'" Id. at 457 (quoting
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599).
41 Id. at 429-30.
4 Id. at 429.
49 Id. at 465.
0 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
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to work at federal NASA facilities and ultimately upheld the
background checks.5 1 The Court did not describe the scope of the
right to informational privacy; it simply assumed, "without
deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort
mentioned in Whalen and Nixon."5 2
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, the
United States circuit courts have clarified the scope of the
constitutional right to informational privacy. Several circuit
courts have considered how this right applies to personal sexual
matters.53 In doing so, the courts explain why these personal
sexual matters, such as sexual orientation, should be protected
within this constitutional right.
B.

PersonalSexual Matters

Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue of
whether the right to informational privacy applies to personal
sexual matters, several United States circuit courts have found
that it does. The Second Circuit, in Doe v. City of New York, 4
established the connection between the constitutional right to
informational privacy and a personal sexual matter.55 In Doe,
the court held that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right
to confidentiality under Whalen concerning his HIV status.5 6 The
plaintiff had sued the City of New York Commission on Human
Rights for revealing that he had contracted HIV, something he
kept very private, to the public in the context of a dispute with
his employer.5 7
The court recognized that the right to
confidentiality includes the right to protection regarding
information about one's health.58 Moreover, the court noted that
the "[e]xtension of the right to confidentiality to personal medical
information recognizes there are few matters that are quite so

51 Id.
52
3

at 751.

Id.
See infra Part I.B.

15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 267 ("[T]his right to privacy can be characterized as a right to
'confidentiality,' to distinguish it from the right to autonomy and independence in
decision-making for personal matters also recognized in Whalen.").
56 Id.
17 Id. at 264-65.
68 Id. at 267.
54
65

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

1110

[Vol. 88:1103

personal as the status of one's health, and few matters the
dissemination of which one would prefer to maintain greater
control over."5 9
In Powell v. Schriver, ° the Second Circuit relied on its
holding in Doe and held that the Constitution protects the right
to maintain the confidentiality of one's transsexualism. 61 The
Powell court "conclude[d] that the reasoning that supports the
holding in Doe compels the conclusion that the Constitution does
indeed protect the right to maintain the confidentiality of one's
transsexualism." 62 The court drew a parallel between the desire
one might have to keep one's HIV status private and the desire
one might have to keep one's transsexualism private because of
the social stigma that often attaches to each. The court further
noted that for individuals who wish to preserve privacy in this
matter, "[tihe excrutiatingly [sic] private and intimate nature of
transsexualism" is "beyond debate."6 4
The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, has narrowly construed the
holdings of Whalen and Nixon 65 and has extended the right to
informational privacy only to interests that implicate a
"fundamental liberty interest."66 However, despite this narrow
reading of Whalen and Nixon, the Sixth Circuit, in Bloch v.
Ribar,67 held that information regarding private sexual matters
public
protection
against
constitutional
warrants

59 Id.

60 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999).
61

Id. at 111.

62

Id.

Id. The court explained:
Individuals who have chosen to abandon one gender in favor of another
understandably might desire to conduct their affairs as if such a transition
was never necessary. That interest in privacy, like the privacy interest of
persons who are HIV positive, is particularly compelling. Like HIV status
as described in Doe, transsexualism is the unusual condition that is likely
to provoke both an intense desire to preserve one's medical confidentiality,
as well as hostility and intolerance from others.

63

Id.
64 Id.

65 These cases describe two types of connected privacy rights protected under

the Fourteenth Amendment: an individual's interest in autonomy in intimate
matters and an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. See
supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
6 Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 1998); see J. P. v. DeSanti, 653
F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981).
67 156 F.3d 673.
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dissemination. 8 In Bloch, the confidential and highly personal
details of a victim's rape by an unknown assailant were released
to the public through a press conference. 69 The Sixth Circuit
recognized that "sexuality and choices about sex, in turn, are
interests of an intimate nature which define significant portions
of our personhood. Publically revealing information regarding
these interests exposes an aspect of our lives that we regard as
highly personal and private." ° Similar to the Second Circuit in
Powell and Doe, the Sixth Circuit noted the social stigma and
humiliation that often attaches itself to someone who is a victim
of a crime of sexual violence. 7
The Ninth Circuit, in Thorne v. City of El Segundo,72 also
held that sexual activities are within the zone of privacy
protected by the Constitution.7 3 The plaintiff in Thorne was
asked about her sexual past by a polygraph examiner during an
examination to become an officer on the city police force." The
court reached its holding by reviewing earlier Supreme Court
cases 75 which held "that such basic matters as contraception,
abortion, marriage, and family life are protected by the
constitution from unwarranted government intrusion."76
The Tenth Circuit, in Eastwood v. Department of Corrections
of the State of Oklahoma,77 has also recognized that the
"constitutionally protected right is implicated when an individual
is forced to disclose information regarding personal sexual
matters."7 8 In Eastwood, a former employee of the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections was harassed with questions about
her sexual history in connection with a claim she made about a
sexual assault. 79 The court found that the employee's right to

Id. at 685-86.
Id. at 676.
70 Id.
at 685.
71 Id.

6
69

726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983).
at 468.
74 Id. at 462.
72

73 Id.

75 The cited cases were: Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976); Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); and
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
76 Thorne, 726 F.2d at 468.
77

846 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1988).

7 Id. at 631.
79 Id. at 629.
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privacy was implicated. 0 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in
James v. City of Douglas,"l held that the plaintiffs clearly
established right to privacy was violated when police disclosed a
sexually explicit videotape of the plaintiff in connection with an
ongoing criminal investigation. 2
These cases demonstrate that while the Supreme Court has
not spoken on the issue of whether the constitutional right to
informational privacy extends to personal sexual matters, several
of the United States circuit courts have. These courts recognize
that one's sexuality and personal choices about sex should be
protected by the Constitution because of their private and
intimate nature. Public disclosure of this information often leads
to social stigma and humiliation. Similarly, sexual orientation is
a matter individuals may choose to keep private for several
reasons, but often because of this same social stigma. While the
circuit courts have established a relationship between the
constitutional right to informational privacy and personal sexual
matters, the courts are less certain about how this constitutional
right applies to sexual orientation when a minor is the one
claiming the right. The issue is further complicated when the
minor claiming this right is doing so in school, even with regard
to the minor's own parent.

II.

THE CONFLICTING CIRCUITS

The issue, which has divided two of the United States circuit
courts, is whether the constitutional right to informational
privacy extends to information about a student's sexual
orientation. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to
address this issue but it did so outside of the school context.8 3
'o Id. at 631.
8' 941 F.2d 1539 (11th
82 See id. at 1540.

Cir. 1991).

'3 There is also a Fourth Circuit case that deals with this issue, Walls v. City of
Petersburg,895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990), but it is no longer instructive. In Walls, the
Fourth Circuit held that mandatory disclosure on a police questionnaire of sexual
activities with members of the same sex did not violate any constitutional right. Id.
at 193. The Fourth Circuit cited Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), as
controlling precedent, finding that if there was no protected right to engage in
consensual sodomy, then there was no bar to a police questionnaire asking about the
applicant's sexual orientation. Walls, 895 F.2d at 193. However, Bowers was
overruled by the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which
held that Bowers was not correct when it was decided and it should not remain
binding precedent. Id. at 578. Accordingly, the decision in Walls is no longer
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However, the element of parental notification was still present in
the case. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a more recent
case,84 addressed this precise issue in the school context and
came to a very different conclusion than the one reached by the
Third Circuit.
A.

The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit grappled with this issue in a case called
Sterling v. Borough of Minersville. 5 At issue in this case was
whether a police officer's threat to disclose the suspected sexual
orientation of an arrested young man to his family member
violated the young man's constitutional right to privacy.8 6
Marcus Wayman, an eighteen-year-old, and a seventeen-year-old
male friend were parked in a lot adjacent to a beer distributor
while the car and both young men were being observed by
defendant police officer, F. Scott Wilinsky.8 7
Wilinsky was
concerned about previous burglaries of the beer distributor and
was suspicious that the car's headlights were out so he called for
backup and Officer Thomas Hoban, the second defendant, swiftly
arrived to the scene. 8 The officers' investigation did not show
any sign of a burglary but it was apparent to the officers that the
two young men had been drinking alcohol. A search of the car
uncovered two condoms.8 9 Wilinsky questioned the boys about
whether they were in the parking lot for a sexual encounter and
testified that both Wayman and his companion eventually
acknowledged that they were homosexuals and were in the
parking lot to engage in consensual sex. 0 The two boys were
then arrested for underage drinking and taken to the Minersville
police station.9 1 At the station, Wilinsky first lectured them
about the Bible's views on homosexual activity and then warned

instructive on this issue because it relied primarily on a case that has since been
overruled. Additionally, Walls did not deal with the issue of minors in the school
context.
I Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2013).
8 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000).
1 Id. at 192.
87 Id.
8 Id.
89

Id.

90 Id. However,
admissions. Id.
91 Id.

the seventeen-year-old

companion denied

making such
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Wayman that if he did not inform his grandfather about his
sexual orientation then Wilinksy would take it upon himself to
disclose this information.9 2 After hearing this, Wayman confided
in his friend that he was going to kill himself and upon release
from custody, Wayman committed suicide in his home.
Wayman's mother, as executrix of Wayman's estate, filed
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Borough of Minersville,
Wilinksy and Hoban, as individuals and in their capacity as
police officers, and the Chief of Police of Minersville.9 4 The
complaint alleged that the officers and the borough violated
Wayman's Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. 95
The
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
district court denied with respect to the right to privacy claim.9 6
The court also ruled that the officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity9 7 since their conduct violated Wayman's
"clearly established right to privacy as protected by the
Constitution. ' 98 Wilinsky and Hoban appealed this ruling.99
In analyzing the right to privacy claim, the Third Circuit
noted that its jurisprudence takes an "encompassing view of
information entitled to a protected right to privacy."' 0 0 The court
highlighted several of its opinions demonstrating this
encompassing view. 1 1 The court concluded, "It is difficult to
Id. at 192-93.
9 Id. at 193.
94 Id.
95 Id. The complaint also alleged that the officers and the borough violated the
laws of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Wayman's
Fourth Amendment right against illegal arrest. Id. These claims are not at issue in
this Note.
92

96 Id.

" "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "Qualified immunity balances two important
interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Id.
11 Sterling, 232 F.3d at 193.
99 Id.
190

Id.

at 195.

Id. at 195-96. The Third Circuit first highlighted its opinion in United States
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980), in which the court
held that private medical information is entitled to privacy protection but cautioned
that the right is not absolute. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 195. In FraternalOrder of Police,
''
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imagine a more private matter than one's sexuality and a less
likely probability that the government would have a legitimate
interest in disclosure of sexual identity. '"102
Accordingly,
Wayman's sexual orientation was an intimate aspect of his
personality entitled to privacy protection under the Supreme
Court's privacy jurisprudence. 10 3 The Third Circuit then noted
that this zone of privacy protection is not absolute and can be
overridden by a compelling government interest. 10 4 However, no
such compelling government interest was identified in this

case. 105
The dissent disagreed with the majority on qualified
immunity grounds.0 6 However, the dissent agreed with the
majority in that Wayman did possess a privacy interest in his
sexual orientation. 10 7 The dissent concluded that it is "fair to say
that our society regards a person's sexual orientation as intimate
information of a personal nature and, accordingly, recognizes a
reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in that
information."' '

Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987), the Third
Circuit held that questions posed concerning medical, financial, and behavioral
information relating to whether police officer applicants were capable of working in
stressful and dangerous conditions did not unconstitutionally infringe on the
applicant's privacy rights, but determined that there were inadequate safeguards on
unnecessary disclosure of this information. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 195. Next, the
Third Circuit looked to Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania TransportationAuthority,
72 F.3d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir. 1995), in which the court considered the alleged violation
of an employee's right to privacy when the employer discovered, through records of
drug purchases made through the employee health program, that the employee had
AIDS. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 195-96. Finally, the Third Circuit looked to Gruenke v.
Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 302-03 (3d Cir. 2000), in which the court held that a swim team
coach requiring one of the team members to take a pregnancy test and then failing
to take appropriate steps to keep the information confidential infringed on the girl's
right to privacy. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196.
102 Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196.
103 Id.
104

Id.

105 Id. The

Third Circuit also went on to consider whether a threat of disclosure,
rather than actual disclosure, constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to
privacy. Id. at 196-97.
106 Id.
at 198 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
107 Id.
108Id. at 198-99.
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The Fifth Circuit
More recently, the Fifth Circuit also grappled with the issue
of a student's right to privacy regarding sexual orientation in a
case called Wyatt v. Fletcher."9 As highlighted above, Barbara
Wyatt, as next-friend of her minor daughter Skye, brought suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against high school softball coaches
Rhonda Fletcher and Cassandra Newell.11° Wyatt alleged that
the coaches disclosed her daughter's sexual orientation during a
disciplinary meeting, and she claimed that this disclosure
constituted an invasion 1 of her daughter's Fourteenth
Amendment right to privacy.' '
On the coaches' motion for summary judgment, the district
court denied qualified immunity to Fletcher and Newell on the
ground that there existed genuine issues of material fact. 1 2 The
Fifth Circuit disagreed and reversed." 3 The court held "that
there is no clearly established law holding that a student in a
public secondary school has a privacy right under the Fourteenth
Amendment that precludes school officials from discussing with a
parent the student's private matters, including matters relating
to sexual activity of the student.""4
The court therefore
concluded that the individual defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity and, accordingly, the federal claims against
them were barred." 5
B.

F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2013).
110Id. at 499.
111 Id. Wyatt also alleged a Fourth Amendment claim based on a disciplinary
confrontation in a locked locker room but that claim is not at issue in this Note. See
id.
112 Id.
109 718

113Id.
114

Id.

Id. The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by laying out the standard for
qualified immunity. Evaluating qualified immunity is a two-step process and the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove that a government official is not entitled to
qualified immunity. Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 257 (5th Cir. 2005). The
first step is to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly
established constitutional or statutory right. Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875,
879 (5th Cir. 2000). A right is clearly established only if its contours are sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that the official's actions violate
that right. Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 919 (5th Cir. 2000). If this
first step is met, then the second step is to determine whether the defendant's
conduct was objectively reasonable. Jones, 203 F.3d at 879. This Note focuses on the
first step of the qualified immunity analysis: whether the specific right to privacy at
issue in this Note is a clearly established constitutional right.
11
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In analyzing Wyatt's claim, the Fifth Circuit first noted that
there is no Fifth Circuit authority on which types of disclosures
are personal enough to trigger the constitutional protection of
informational privacy. 116 Wyatt argued that the contours of her
daughter's asserted right were well-established and relied on two
Fifth Circuit cases for support: Fadjo v. Coon" 7 and ACLU of
Mississippi v. Mississippi."' The court concluded that neither of
these cases even touched on the privacy rights between a student
and a parent." 9 Fadjo concerned the disclosure of an insurance
beneficiary's personal information in the context of a criminal
investigation. 20 In that case, the Fifth Circuit noted that the
plaintiff had been promised that the information he provided to
investigators would remain confidential, but no such promise was
made to Skye. 12 ' ACLU of Mississippi concerned the dismantling
of a state agency committed and devoted to the perpetuation of
racial segregation in Mississippi whose purpose was to act as the
state's secret intelligence arm.'22 The Fifth Circuit distinguished
this case from the present case on two grounds: First, the
disclosure involving Skye was only to her mother; and second,
unlike the facts in ACLU of Mississippi, the government was not
illegally collecting information in order to cause harm to private
23
citizens.1
The Fifth Circuit then looked for authority from other
circuits and did not find any cases to be particularly
persuasive. 24 The court noted the Sterling case from the Third
Circuit but did not give it much weight and dismissed its value
rather flippantly. 2 The court considered several aspects of the
Sterling case in an effort to dismiss its authority: First, the
Third Circuit's decision is not controlling authority on the Fifth
Circuit; second, the victim of the "outing" in Sterling was not a
minor, which suggests that if the victim had been a minor the
116 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 505 (quoting Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485,
490 (5th Cir. 2002)).
"1 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981).
118 911 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1990).
119 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 506.
120 Id.; Fadjo, 633 F.2d at 1174.
121 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 506-07.
122 Id.
at 507; ACLU of Miss., 911 F.2d at 1068.
123 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 508.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 509 (explaining that the Third Circuit's opinion is "not controlling
authority" and thus, "its reasoning, standing alone, is not dispositive").
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case could have been decided differently; and third, the cases
from within the Third Circuit that the Third Circuit relied on
were dubious at best. 126 In sum, the Fifth Circuit held that
Wyatt had not alleged "a clearly established constitutional
right-drawn either from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence,
or from that of other
from [the Fifth Circuit's] own precedent
1 27
circuits-that the coaches violated."

The dissent highlighted that despite the majority's attempt
to distinguish the cases cited by Wyatt on the basis that none
occurred in the school context, the majority ultimately conceded
that individuals have a privacy interest in personal sexual
matters.'28 The dissent then noted a number of cases from
outside of the Fifth Circuit that have recognized a right to
privacy regarding personal sexual matters.'29 The dissent also
noted that the majority failed to provide any authority for its
finding that the right to privacy in personal sexual matters does
not extend to high school students. 130 To the contrary, the
dissent found that the constitutional right to privacy does extend
to minors, and the school context does not defeat the existence of
this right."' Rather, the school context comes into play with
regard to a balancing test and whether the government's interest
outweighs a student's privacy right. 132 The question then
becomes whether the coaches had a legitimate interest that
outweighed Skye's right to privacy. The dissent agreed with the
lower court, which conducted this balancing test, and concluded
that whatever the state's interest may have been, it did not
orientation
outweigh Skye's interest in keeping her sexual
13
confidential, especially with regard to her mother.'
The Third and Fifth Circuits, due to their conflicting
holdings, did not solve the issue of whether the constitutional
right to informational privacy extends to information about a
student's sexual orientation. Since the Supreme Court has been

Id.
Id. at 510.
128 Id. at 513 (Graves, J., dissenting).
129 See supra Part I.B.
130 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 513 (Graves, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 514.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 515.
126
127
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silent on this issue, an examination of the Court's holdings in
other areas of student privacy, such as pregnancy, abortion, and
contraception, sheds light on this unanswered question.

III.

AREAS OF STUDENT PRIVACY

As a general matter, the Constitution protects the rights of
both minors and adults.1 34 In In re Gault,13 5 the Supreme Court
declared that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone."13 6 The protections of the Constitution
do not fade away as a minor enters different situations. In37
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
the Supreme Court, in the context of the First Amendment, held
that neither students nor teachers shed their constitutional
rights "at the schoolhouse gate." 3 ' However, the Court also
noted that it has repeatedly emphasized the comprehensive
authority of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in
schools.' 39 The Court further noted:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism.
School officials do not possess absolute
authority over their students. Students in school as well as out
of school are 'persons' under our Constitution.
They are
possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect,
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the
1 40
State.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1967).
387 U.S. 1.
136 Id. at 13. The Court relied on three previous cases in reaching this
conclusion. See generally Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (considering the
requirements for a valid waiver of the 'exclusive' jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court of
the District of Columbia so that a juvenile could be tried in the adult criminal court);
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (concerning the confession of a fourteenyear-old boy who had been held for five days without officers sending for his parents
or seeing that he had advice of a lawyer or an adult friend); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596 (1948) (involving the admissibility of a confession by a fifteen-year-old boy in a
state criminal court of general jurisdiction).
137 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
134

138 Id. at 506.

9 Id. at 507; see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie
Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) ("A student's privacy interest is limited in a
public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline,
health, and safety.").
140 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
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In a later case, New Jersey v. T.L.O.,' 4 ' the Court confirmed
the indisputable nature of the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the rights of students against infringement
The Supreme Court further clarified
by public school officials.
this holding in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton. 43 In
Vernonia, the Court held, in the context of drug testing of
student athletes, that while children do not shed their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, "the nature
of those
1' 44
rights is what is appropriate for children in school.'

The Third and Fifth Circuits, over ten years apart, grappled
with the issue of a student's right to privacy regarding sexual
orientation and reached different results. As more teens are
"coming out" at younger ages, 145 identifying and understanding
the contours of this right becomes relevant to increasing numbers
of students. The Supreme Court has clarified that constitutional
protections do extend to minors and these protections do not
disappear once a minor enters the school building. 46 In order to
determine whether a high school student possesses the right to
informational privacy in school regarding the student's sexual
orientation, this Part examines and analogizes the privacy rights
of students in other personal and intimate areas such as
pregnancy, abortion, and contraception.
A.

Pregnancy
Pregnancy, like sexual orientation, is an intimate area of a
student's life that she would want protected from unwarranted
Similar to sexual
government intrusion and disclosure.
141

469 U.S. 325 (1985).

Id. at 334.
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the
citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education
not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly
discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.
Id. at 334 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
14
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
14 Id. at 655-56.
145 See Denizet-Lewis, supra note 22.
146 See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
142
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orientation, pregnancy in high school is something that might
lead to social stigma, humiliation, and judgment. A student may
wish to handle her pregnancy in her own way, perhaps by
seeking an abortion, discussed infra, without parental
involvement. If a school is alerted to the fact that a student is
pregnant, automatic disclosure to the student's parent may not
be in the best interests of the student. Similarly, if a school is
alerted to the fact that a student is homosexual, automatic
disclosure to the student's parent may not be in the best interests
of the student. Several of the United States circuit courts have
held that the right to informational privacy extends to personal
sexual matters because of their private and intimate nature, 1
and this could not be more true than in the context of a high
school student who is faced with pregnancy.
The Third Circuit, in Gruenke v. Seip,' 48 recognized the
private nature of pregnancy in the context of high school. 49 The
court held that disclosure of a high school student's pregnancy
"falls squarely within the contours of the recognized right of one
to be free from disclosure of personal matters." 5 0 Leah Gruenke,
an eleventh grader, was a member of the varsity swim team.' 5 '
The varsity swim coach suspected that Leah might be pregnant,
but Leah continually denied that there was any possibility that
she was or could be pregnant." 2 Ultimately, Leah took a
pregnancy test, allegedly at her coach's request, the results of
which were positive. 53 Leah then took two more tests, the
results of which were negative. 5 4 After learning of the first
positive test result, the coach inquired as to whether it would be
safe to keep Leah on the team, and upon learning that it was,
allowed Leah to continue competing.' 5
The coach did not
attempt to talk directly to Leah's parents, and Leah repeatedly
denied that she was pregnant until she finally visited a doctor
who informed her that she was six months pregnant. 5 6 Even

149

See supra Part I.B.
225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 302-03.

150

Id.

147
148

I," Id. at 295.
152 Id. at 295-96.
153
164
155
156

Id. at 296-97. The parties differ in their recount of the facts. See id. at 296.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
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then, Leah did not reveal her condition to anyone because she
wanted to keep competing, but eventually Leah's teammates,
their parents, and Leah's mother learned that she was
pregnant.'57
Leah's mother, for herself and on her daughter's behalf, filed
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that their rights under the
Constitution were violated when the coach required Leah to take
a pregnancy test. 158 The Gruenkes subsequently amended their
complaint, which included, among other claims, that the required
pregnancy test violated Leah's right to privacy regarding
personal matters. 5 9 The coach moved for summary judgment
claiming qualified immunity and the district court granted the
160
coach's motion, which was then followed by an appeal.
The Third Circuit concluded that not only did Leah's claim
"fall[] squarely within the contours of the recognized right of one
to be free from disclosure of personal matters," but also
concerned medical information, which the Third Circuit
previously held is entitled to that very same protection.' 61 The
court also noted that if, as Leah alleged, the information about
her pregnancy tests was confidential and the coach compelled
Leah to take the tests, then his alleged failure to take
appropriate steps to keep that information confidential by
discussing the tests with Leah's other teammates and the results
with his assistant coaches would infringe on Leah's right to
162
privacy.
Leah's situation is analogous to Skye's situation in Wyatt v.
Fletcher. In both cases, a high school student had a personal
sexual matter that she wished not to be disclosed by school
officials. Despite this, in both cases, disclosure was made, albeit
to different individuals. The results of the disclosure for Leah
and Skye were also somewhat similar as both experienced a kind
Id.
"' Id. The Gruenkes also brought their claims under Pennsylvania state tort
law. Id.
...Id. The Gruenkes also alleged that the required pregnancy test constituted
an illegal search in violation of Leah's Fourth Amendment rights, violated Leah and
her mother's right to familial privacy, violated Leah's right to free speech and
association protected by the First Amendment, and violated Leah and her mother's
rights under state tort law. Id.
160 Id. at 297-98.
161Id. at 302-03 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980)).
162 Id. at 303.
157
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The Third Circuit recognized that
of social isolation. 163
pregnancy falls squarely within the contours of the recognized
right of one to be free from disclosure of personal matters, despite
the reality that a pregnant teenager may need the guidance of a
parent. 164 In the context of homosexuality, the same kind of
parental guidance is likely not as necessary because the health
risks and lifestyle changes that accompany pregnancy do not
accompany homosexuality. If sexual actions and their results are
squarely within the contours of the recognized right of one to be
free from disclosure of personal matters, then sexual orientation
should fall squarely within these same contours.
A few years after Gruenke, a judge in the Eastern District of
New York denied a motion for a preliminary injunction to
prohibit the Port Washington School District from implementing
a policy requiring school officials, including school nurses, to
notify parents when the officials learn of a student's
pregnancy. 165 The court denied the motion on the grounds that
the plaintiffs lacked standing and the case was not yet ripe for
judicial review. 166 However, in doing so, the court also based its
decision on whether the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits. 167 The court found that they were not.1 68 The court based
this finding on the idea that the cases regarding a minor's right
to an abortion without parental involvement, discussed infra, do
not apply in the pregnancy context.' 69 The court stated that the
"[p]laintiffs may not stretch the protections that apply to a minor
seeking an abortion to cover the disclosure of her pregnancy to
her parents." 7 ° In doing so, the court completely missed the
mark.
Although pregnancy and abortion are certainly separate
concepts, they are "inextricably linked and the right to an
abortion means nothing if the law can be circumvented by

163 See id. at 297; Complaint, supra note 2,
12, 23.
164 See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 302-03.
165 Port Wash. Teachers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Port

Wash. Union Free Sch.

Dist., 361 F. Supp. 2d 69, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Melissa Prober, Note, Please
Don't Tell My Parents: The Validity of School Policies Mandating Parental
Notification of a Student's Pregnancy, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 557 (2005).
166 Port Wash. Teachers'Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
167

168

Id.
Id. at 77-79.

169 Id. at 78.
170

Id.
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requiring the disclosure of a minor's pregnancy to her parents."1 7'
School policies that require mandatory notification of a student's
pregnancy violate her constitutional right to privacy by
eliminating her right to seek an abortion without parental
involvement. 172 Furthermore, a majority of the states have laws
or policies that allow pregnant minors to receive prenatal care
73
and delivery services without parental consent or notification.
Specifically in New York, "[any person who is pregnant may give
effective consent for medical, dental, health and hospital services
relating to prenatal care." 74 In Pennsylvania, any minor who
"has been pregnant" may consent to health services for herself,
even without the consent of the minor's parents. 175 Minors in
California may also consent to medical care relating to the
76
treatment of pregnancy.
Although many courts have not articulated the contours of a
high school student's right to privacy with respect to pregnancy,
there is authority to suggest that high school students possess
such a right. Pregnancy is accompanied by serious physical
changes for the student and the possibility of bringing new life
into the world.
The consequences associated with sexual
orientation are not nearly as substantial. A student may need
guidance and support from a parent in the event of a pregnancy
due to the health risks and serious life choices that are involved.
In contrast, though sexual orientation also involves important
decisions, it does not carry with it the same health risks or
serious life choices that accompany a pregnancy. A student's
decision to be open about the student's sexual orientation in high
school thus does not require or necessitate the same kind of, or
any, parental involvement. Accordingly, if information regarding
a high school student's pregnancy is a personal sexual matter
Prober, supra note 165, at 563.
Id.
173 See Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief Minors' Access to PrenatalCare
(2015),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibMAPC.pdf;
Heather
Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the Right To Consent to Health Care,
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y, Aug. 2000, 4, 4, available at http://www.gutt
macher.org/pubs/tgr/03/4/gr030404.pdf.
174 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 (McKinney 2012).
175 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10101 (West 2012) ("Any minor who is eighteen years of
age or older, or has graduated from high school, or has married, or has been
pregnant, may give effective consent to medical, dental and health services for
himself or herself, and the consent of no other person shall be necessary.").
176 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6925 (West 2013).
171

172
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that can be protected by the constitutional right to informational
privacy despite the potential need for parental involvement, then
information regarding a high school student's sexual orientation
should be protected as well.
A student who identifies as
homosexual should be able to do so freely in school without
parental notification. In the context of both pregnancy and
homosexuality, disclosure to parents may not always be in the
student's best interests.
B.

Abortion

Abortion, unlike pregnancy, is an area that the Supreme
Court has ruled on with respect to minors' rights. In the abortion
context, unlike in the sexual orientation context, issues of
parental consent as well as parental notification are
implicated.'7 7 Parental consent statutes require that at least one
of the minor's parents consent to the minor's abortion before the
doctor is able to perform the procedure. 7 " Parental notification
statutes require that one or both parents be notified that the
minor plans to obtain the abortion before the doctor is able to
perform the procedure.' 9 While consent and notification are
separate concepts, they are closely related. In order for a parent
to consent or not consent to a minor's abortion, the parent must
first be notified that the child is pregnant and seeking an
abortion. If parental consent is required, a child cannot legally
conceal an abortion from her parents and thus her right to
privacy with regard to her parents will be eliminated.' 0
However, the Supreme Court has recognized a minor's right to
privacy with respect to both parental consent and parental
notification statutes to a certain degree.'

177 See Jennifer C. Friedman, ParentalNotice in State Abortion Statutes: Filling
the Gap in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 437, 445
(1998).
178 Id.
171 Id. Usually, there is a twenty-four to forty-eight-hour waiting period after
the notification and before the minor may undergo an abortion that accompanies
these laws. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 422 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S.
502, 507 (1990).
180 See generally Wynn Heather Sourial, Note, The Erosion of Roe v. Wade: Do
Minors Have Any Rights?, 13 WHIrrIER L. REV. 285 (1992).
1 See infra notes 182-212 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,8 2
considered the constitutionality of several provisions of a
Missouri abortion statute.18 3 One of the provisions required the
written consent of a parent or a person in loco parentis if the
woman seeking the abortion was unmarried and under the age of
eighteen, unless a physician certified that the abortion was
necessary to save the life of the mother.l" The Supreme Court
held that a state may not impose a blanket provision requiring
the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition
for an unmarried minor to obtain an abortion during the first
twelve weeks of her pregnancy.1 8 1 In arriving at this holding, the
Supreme Court reiterated the sentiment of In re Gault18 6 and
expressed that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age
of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights."8 7 The Court also
noted, "Any independent interest the parent may have in the
termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more
weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature
enough to have become pregnant.1 8 8

182

428 U.S. 52 (1976).

18 Id. at 58.

Id. at 72.
Id. at 74. The Court stated:
Just as with the requirement of consent from the spouse, so here, the State
does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute,
and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for
withholding the consent.
Id. The Court made clear that it was not suggesting that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy. Id. at
75. Rather, the issue with the parental consent provision in the Missouri statute was
that it imposed a special consent provision that could be exercised by a person other
than the woman and her physician as a prerequisite to a minor's termination of her
pregnancy without sufficient justification for the restriction. Id.
186 "[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
"I' Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. However, the Court did recognize "that the State
has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults."
Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968)).
184
185

188

Id.

at 75.
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A few years later, the Supreme Court, in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti II),"89 continued the inquiry it began in Danforth
regarding parental consent to abortion. 9 ' The Court began its
analysis by reaffirming its prior holding that the Constitution
extends its protections to minors.191 It also noted the unique
nature of the abortion decision as compared to many other
decisions made by minors. The Court observed that "[tihe need
to preserve the constitutional right and the unique nature of the
abortion decision, especially when made by a minor, require a
State to act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster
The Court then
parental involvement in this matter."19 2
reaffirmed its holding in Danforth by stating that a state may not
impose a "blanket provision" requiring the consent of a parent or
person in loco parentis as a condition for an unmarried minor to
obtain an abortion during the first twelve weeks of her
pregnancy. 93 Although deference to parents may be appropriate
in certain circumstances, the unique nature and consequences of
the abortion decision make it inappropriate to give a parent the
power of "parental veto."'94 Accordingly, the Court concluded
"that if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain
one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide
an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion
can be obtained."'9 5 The Court further clarified that if, on one
189 443
190

Id.

U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
at 624.

191Id. at 633 ("A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the
protection of the Constitution.").
192 Id. at 642.
,91Id. at 643 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74).
194 Id. at 639-40, 643 (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74).
191 Id. at 643 (footnote omitted). The Court explained:
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1) that
she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion
decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents'
wishes; or 2) that even if she is not able to make this decision
independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests. The
proceeding in which this showing is made must assure that a resolution of
the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with
anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for
an abortion to be obtained. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the
provision requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to the
"absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found impermissible in
Danforth.
Id. at 643-44 (footnote omitted). The requirements derived from Bellotti II were
restated in Lambert v. Wicklund as follows:
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hand, a court determines that an abortion is in a minor's best
interests, she is entitled to court authorization without any
parental involvement. 196 On the other hand, a court may deny an
abortion request by an immature minor if it concludes that the
minor's best interests would be served by parental consultation,
or the court may defer the decision until the parent or parents
become involved.

197

The Supreme Court has clarified the judicial "bypass"
procedures relating to parental consent to the abortion decision
but it has not been as clear on the procedures relating to parental
notification. 198 Parental notification, as opposed to parental
consent, is more analogous to what might occur in the context of
sexual orientation. In H. L. v. Matheson,'99 the Court reviewed
its earlier holdings and confirmed that an abortion statute
setting out a "mere requirement of parental notice" does not
violate the constitutional rights of a dependent, immature
minor.200
In Matheson, the Court was considering the
constitutionality of a Utah abortion statute and ultimately held
that the fact that the Utah statute may inhibit some minors from
seeking abortions was not a valid basis to void the statute.2"'
However, the Court's holding was limited to the particular
circumstances of a minor: (1) who was dependent on her parents,
(2) who was not emancipated by marriage or otherwise, and
(3) who made no claim or showing as to her maturity. 02 The
Court's holding thus suggests that if a minor is able to
demonstrate her maturity, she might be able to obtain an
abortion without parental notification.

[A] constitutional parental consent statute must contain a bypass provision
that meets four criteria: (i) allow the minor to bypass the consent
requirement if she establishes that she is mature enough and well enough
informed to make the abortion decision independently; (ii) allow the minor
to bypass the consent requirement if she establishes that the abortion
would be in her best interests; (iii) ensure the minor's anonymity; and
(iv) provide for expeditious bypass procedures.
520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997).
19 Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 647.
9 Id. at 647-48.
198 Friedman, supra note 177, at 444.
199 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
200 Id. at 409 (internal quotation
201

202

Id. at 413.
Id. at 407.

marks omitted).
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In Hodgson v. Minnesota, °3 the Court considered the
constitutionality of the forty-eight-hour waiting period after
parental notification and the two-parent notification requirement
to seek an abortion.20 4 In considering the forty-eight-hour delay,
the Court found that it "imposes only a minimal burden on the
right of the minor to decide whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. "2°5
In considering the two-parent notification
requirement, however, the Court found "that the requirement
that both parents be notified, whether or not both wish to be
notified or have assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the
child, does not reasonably further any legitimate state
2 06
interest."
Moreover, in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health
(Akron II),207 the Court noted that while it had required bypass
procedures for parental consent statutes, it had not decided
whether parental notification statutes must contain the same
bypass procedures. 0 8 However, the Court decided to leave that
question open because it was not necessary to answer the
question in determining the constitutionality of the Ohio statute
before the Court. 2 9 The Court did comment, however, that "it is
a corollary to the greater intrusiveness of consent statutes that a
bypass procedure that will suffice for a consent statute will
suffice also for a notice statute."21 0 In Lambert v. Wicklund," the
Supreme Court reiterated that it has not decided whether a
parental notification statute must include some sort of bypass
provision in order to be constitutional.1 2
Though abortion and homosexuality differ in significant
ways, certain parallels regarding how they affect a minor's life
can be drawn between the two. The choice to obtain an abortion
and the choice to openly identify as homosexual are both choices
that a minor may wish to make without parental involvement.
While parents certainly have an interest in raising and guiding
497 U.S. 417 (1990).
Id. at 422-23.
205 Id. at 449.
206 Id. at 450.
207 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
201 Id. at 510.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 511.
211 520 U.S. 292 (1997).
212 Id. at 295.
203
204
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their child, alerting parents to a high school student's pregnancy
and subsequent choice to abort the pregnancy may do more harm
for the student than good. The Supreme Court has recognized
this by considering and emphasizing the significance of a minor's
maturity in making the abortion decision.21 3 The Court has
established a procedure by which a minor can seek an abortion
without any parental involvement.21 4 A state statute containing
a judicial bypass procedure is unconstitutional to the extent that
it mandates parental notification of the minor's choice to seek an
abortion, specifically if the minor is a mature minor who can
demonstrate that having an abortion would be in her best
interests.2 15
Though the Court has not clarified the
constitutionality of parental notification statutes in the same
way that it has clarified the constitutionality of parental consent
statutes, the overarching message of the Court's rulings in this
area is that under certain circumstances, minors possess a right
to seek and obtain an abortion without parental involvement. In
other words, minors possess a right to privacy with respect to
this difficult and significant decision.
The Supreme Court cases in this area deal with abortion in
the context of the minor, her parent or parents, and the medical
facility that will be performing the abortion. In the school
context, "policies that require parental notification of a student's
pregnancy, yet do not provide the student with the required
judicial bypass procedure, effectuate an unconstitutional regime
because they take away the ability of the student to seek an
abortion without the involvement of a third-party." 216 It follows
that if a student discloses that she is pregnant in a confidential
conversation with a school official, the school official may not
notify the student's parents about the pregnancy because to do so
would remove the student's ability to seek an abortion without
parental involvement by means of a judicial bypass procedure.21 7
This comports directly with the Supreme Court's conclusion in
Bellotti I:

Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality opinion).
Id.
215 See William H. Danne, Jr., Validity, Construction, and Application of
Statutes Requiring Parental Notification of or Consent to Minor's Abortion, 77
A.L.R.5th 1, § 4(c) (2000).
216 Prober, supra note 165, at 564.
217 Id. at 567-68.
213

214
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[E]very minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to
go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her
parents. If she satisfies the court that she is mature and well
enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on
her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental
consultation or consent.2 18
Thus, if a school has a mandatory notification policy, in order
for it to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the school district
would have to provide an "expeditious, confidential bypass
procedure where the pregnant student could demonstrate that
she is mature enough to make a reproductive medical decision on
her own or, even if she is not, that an abortion is in her best
interests."2 9
Moreover, from a public policy standpoint,
promising confidentiality will encourage more students to use
school-based health care providers. 22 0 Teenagers are hesitant to
seek certain types of medical care if their parents will be notified.
However, if they are confident that the services will be kept
confidential, teenagers will be likely to utilize medical services
available to them at school.22 1
Abortion, like pregnancy, but unlike homosexuality, carries
with it the weight of a life-changing decision and serious health
risks. Despite this, the Supreme Court has recognized that
under certain circumstances, a minor should have the ability to
seek an abortion without parental involvement. The choice to
identify as homosexual does not carry with it the same kinds of
severe consequences. If mature minors are afforded a right to
privacy with respect to their parents in their choice to seek an
abortion, they should also be afforded a similar right to privacy
in their choice to identify as homosexual in the school setting. If
a minor, specifically a student, has chosen to keep his or her
sexual orientation private, a school's disclosure of this
information to the minor's parent is a violation of the minor's
constitutional right to privacy.

218
219

220
221

Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 647.
Prober, supra note 165, at 568.
See id. at 574-75.
Id.
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Contraception

Another intimate area encompassed in a minor's right to
privacy involves access to contraception. Contraception, like
pregnancy, abortion, and homosexuality, is a personal sexual
matter in which a minor may not want parental involvement. As
a general rule, the Supreme Court has concluded that the
"constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of
contraceptives to minors is a fortiori foreclosed."222 In Carey v.
Population Services, International,223 the Court reiterated that
"the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting
procreation extends to minors as well as to adults."224 The Court
also noted that the state's interest in the protection of the health
of a pregnant minor and of potential life is more implicated by
the abortion decision than by the decision to use a "nonhazardous
contraceptive." 225 Accordingly, the New York statute at hand in
Carey, which contained a prohibition on nonprescription
contraceptives to persons under the age of sixteen, was declared
invalid.226
Parental notification regarding a minor's decision to use
contraception creates constitutional dilemmas. A minor's right to
privacy and the issue of patient confidentiality are at odds with
parental rights and parental notification.227
Although the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the judicial bypass
requirement in the context of regulations constraining a minor's
contraceptive choices, the constitutional contours that apply to
abortion cases "inherently apply to contraceptive cases."225
In light of the fact that the Supreme Court has not ruled on
the constitutionality of parental notification in the context of
contraception, the opinions of the circuit courts help to clarify the
issue. The Third Circuit, in Anspach v. City of Philadelphia,
222

Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (plurality opinion).

431 U.S. 678.
224 Id. at 693.
225 Id. at 694.
223

226

See id. at 691-94.

227

See Dean J. Haas, "Doctor, I'm Pregnant and Fifteen-I Can't Tell My

Parents-Please Help Me": Minor Consent, Reproductive Rights, and Ethical
Principlesfor Physicians, 86 N.D. L. REV. 63, 104 (2010).
228 Elizabeth Frost, Note, Zero Privacy: Schools Are Violating Students'
Fourteenth Amendment Right of Privacy Under the Guise of Enforcing Zero
Tolerance Policies, 81 WASH. L. REV. 391, 401 (2006); see also Carey, 431 U.S. at 694.
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Department of Public Health,2 29 considered a minor's access to
contraceptives from the perspective of the parents' constitutional
rights. 23 1 Melissa Anspach, a sixteen-year-old, visited the City's
Department of Public Health because she feared she might be
pregnant.231 After taking the second dose of the morning-after
pill, Melissa started to get very ill and was taken by her father to
the emergency room of a nearby hospital. 2
Melissa and her
parents filed a complaint alleging that the Center violated her
parent's constitutional right of parental guidance by providing
Melissa with medication without parental consent.3 3
In terms of parental interference with minors' rights, the
Third Circuit noted that while the Fourteenth Amendment
"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
23 4
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children,"
"the right is neither absolute nor unqualified."2 5 The type of
interference that the Anspachs were asserting they had a right to
would impose a constitutional obligation on state actors to
contact parents of a minor or encourage minors to contact their
parents in this type of situation. 236 "Either requirement would
undermine the minor's right to privacy and exceed the scope of
237
the familial liberty interest protected under the Constitution."
In terms of parental notification, the Third Circuit articulated
"that there is no constitutional right to parental notification of a
2 38
minor child's exercise of reproductive privacy rights."
The Third Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court's rulings
concerning parental notification in the abortion context, rejecting
the claim that parental consent is required unless a court allows
the minor to "bypass" the parents. 239 The Supreme Court's
jurisprudence with respect to a minor's right to seek an abortion
"concern[s] the constitutional limitations on a state to interfere
229

503 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2007).

230 Id.

at 258.
Id. at 259.
232 Id. at 259-60.
233 Id. at 260.
234 Id. at 262 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)) (internal
231

quotation marks omitted).
235Id. (quoting C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 182 (3d Cir. 2005))

(internal quotation marks omitted).
237

Id.
Id.

238

Id. at 269.

236

239 Id.

at 269-70.
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with a minor's right to abortion, rather than a parent's
affirmative right to be apprised of a minor's reproductive
decisions generally."2 40
Moreover, the abortion cases do not
"create a constitutional right of parental notification about an
abortion, or any other reproductive health decision-they merely
find such notification constitutionally permissible when paired
with a judicial bypass provision to protect the minor's health and

safety. "241
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit also considered the distribution
of contraceptives to minors without parental notification by a
publicly operated family planning clinic.24 2 The court recognized
that the constitutional right being implicated by those who desire
to use the services of the clinic is "the right of personal
privacy. "243
The Sixth Circuit found that there was no
deprivation of the liberty interest of parents in the practice of not
notifying them of their children's voluntary decisions to
participate in the activities of the clinic.2 ' The court considered
the Supreme Court's opinion in Carey and concluded that the
"various opinions of the Justices do not indicate a belief that
parents have a constitutional right to be notified by a public
facility which distributes contraceptives to unemancipated
minors."24 5
The choices a minor makes with respect to contraception are
similar to the choices a minor makes with respect to pregnancy,
abortion, and homosexuality. In each context, the minor may
desire a lack of parental involvement. Thus, in each context, the
constitutional right to informational privacy is implicated. In the
contraception context, although the Supreme Court has not
officially ruled on the issue, there is authority to suggest that a
minor's right to privacy should protect the minor's decision to use
contraception without parental involvement or notification. If
abortion decisions are within a realm of privacy for minors, it
follows that contraception decisions, which are likely less
dangerous and less grave, should also be protected within that
same realm of privacy. Similarly, if choices about sexual health
240 Id. at 270.

Id.
Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1163 (6th Cir. 1980).
241 Id. at 1166.
24 Id. at 1168.
245 Id. at 1169.
241
242
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are encompassed in a minor's right to privacy, this same right
should protect choices about sexual preference. Just as a student
may wish to use contraception without parental involvement, a
student may wish to identify as homosexual in school without
parental notification.
CONCLUSION

Courts have recognized the rights of minors to make
independent decisions when it comes to pregnancy, abortion, and
contraception. This need comes from an understanding that
parental involvement is not always in the best interests of a
minor, and that a mature minor should be able to make decisions
about sexual health and sexual activities without parental
notification or consultation. The same rationale used by different
courts in arriving at this conclusion applies to homosexuality as
well. The Third Circuit recognized this when it decided Sterling
v. Borough of Minersville, and the Fifth Circuit unfortunately
failed to recognize this when it decided Wyatt v. Fletcher.
A minor may be open about his or her sexual orientation in
school but choose to keep this information private at home. If a
school discloses to a student's parent without the consent of the
student that the student is pregnant, is seeking an abortion, or is
using contraception, the school is eliminating the student's right
to informational privacy regarding personal sexual matters.
Similarly, if a school discloses to a student's parent without the
consent of the student that the student is openly identifying as
homosexual, the school is once again eliminating the student's
right to informational privacy regarding personal sexual matters.
While the contours of this right will vary based on the facts of the
situation, school officials must recognize that they cannot make
this kind of disclosure without violating a student's
constitutional rights.
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